Khaled Alotaibi

Electrical and Computer Engineering

North Carolina A&T State University

Email: kfalotai AT ncat.edu

 

 

 

Research Intersts

Control in Power System (SCADA) , False Data Injection Against State Estimation , Cyber-attack in a Dynamics System

 

Education

B.Sc.: 2005, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, Electrical & Computer Engineering

M.Sc.: 2009, North Carolina A&T State University, Computer Science

PhD: 2010-now, North Carolina A&T State University, Electrical Engineering

 

Publications

My Google Scholar webpage: (publications)

  1. I. A. Kateeb, K. F. AlOtaibi, L. Burton, and M. S. Peluso, “Protection Considerations for Telecommunications Network,” Proceedings of the 2013 American Society for Engineering Education Pacific Southwest Conference, 2013, pp. 441-451.
  2. I. A. Kateeb, K. F. AlOtaibi, L. Burton, M. S. Peluso, and E. R. Sowells, “Community Attitudes Related to Telecommunications Cables,” Proceedings of the 2013 American Society for Engineering Education Pacific Southwest Conference, 2013, pp. 468-476.
  3. I. A. Kateeb, K. F. AlOtaibi, L. Burton, and M. S. Peluso, “The Fundamental Component of Telecommunications Cabling,” Proceedings of the 2013 American Society for Engineering Education Pacific Southwest Conference, 2013, pp. 452-467.
  4. I. Kateeb, L. Burton, M. S Peluso, P. Chopade, K. AlOtaibi “ Copper cables: Should they be phased out as last mile broadband solutions? Southeastcon, 2013 Proceedings of IEEE, 2013.

 

Current Research

Protection state estimation in power system from cyber-attack :

Electrical power is needed for both domestic and industrial activities. The need to make power systems reliable cannot be over emphasized. Different sensors are therefore used to measure the systems’ parameters. Most often, the measuring site is separate from the systems monitoring/control center. Data needs therefore to be transmitted from the measurement center to the control center for analysis. To test whether this data has not been contaminated, many techniques have been used in literature to find out whether the measurement data is significantly different from the estimation. This presentation exposes a common vulnerability of one such existing bad data detection algorithms which is commonly used. This happens when a Cyber-attacker intelligently manipulates the system’s measurement values, which will result in corrupted state variables. The Residual Test algorithm, current being used by power system (control centers) is not valid for such a scenario of attack. We also present a Chi-Square hypothesis test algorithm. By using the results for three different scenarios, we have pointed out the weakness of these two techniques and shown how the combination of these two can be used in decision making.